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Abstract.  This  report  surveys  common  security  requirements  for  enterprise 
applications and analyzes how aspects can meet these. It analyzes how large-
scale applications of aspects to security can work. It is intended to stimulate 
discussion by complementing research that looks at small-scale security aspects. 
The  paper  is  to  stimulate  discussion  about  design  patterns  and  how  AOSD 
systems can provide better support for security. It examines requirements for 
effective application of aspects to security with a focus on the kinds of join 
points  that  are  relevant.  It  considers  common  security  requirements  and 
discusses  some  possible  aspect-oriented  designs.  It  then  evaluates  the 
effectiveness of existing AOP systems support, especially in the area of pointcut 
definitions, and discusses areas for further investigation. 
1   Introduction 
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [KICZ96] in particular and the broader field of 
Aspect-Oriented Software Development (AOSD) in general offer great promise for 
improving information security. AOSD is relevant for all the major pillars of security: 
authentication, access control, integrity, non-repudiation as well as for the supporting 
administration and monitoring disciplines required for effective security. 
There has been valuable pioneering research into applying AOP to security. The 
work of Shah ([SHAH02]) and Viega et al. ([VIEG01]) apply AOP to enforce secure 
coding practices. The work of De Win et al. ([DEWI01]) applies AspectJ to enforce 
access control. There have been similar uses of AOP to separate security policy from 
applications  ([WELC03]). Previous  work  ([ANCO99,  WELC00]) used  used  meta-
programming techniques. Meta-programming provides tremendous power, but can be 
difficult to use; AOP was invented to provide more concrete and usable techniques to 
achieve similar ends. 
There is also a rich literature on the topic of join points, pointcuts, expressiveness, 
and effective ways of writing pointcuts, etc. (e.g., [GYBE03, BODK03]). 
This paper describes examples of crosscutting  security rules that are frequently 
encountered. It then analyzes the relevant join points and properties thereof that can 
be used to describe those using current AOP systems. It then identifies areas for future 
work and summarizes the findings. 
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2  Security Scenarios 
In  this  report  we  primarily  consider  how  to  implement  authentication  and  access 
control. However, we want to start by identifying a broad list of common security use 
cases of enterprise IT applications, based on our experiences. Here is a small set of 
these 
·  Web user authentication 
·  Web service authentication 
·  Indirect database authentication 
·  Delegated authentication 
·  Role-based access control to application functions 
·  Role-based access control to data 
·  Instance-level access control to data 
·  Field-level access control to data 
·  Filtering operations available (or enabled) 
·  Filtering information displayed  
·  Encryption and decryption of data at rest 
·  Encryption and decryption of data in flight 
·  Functional access control to data 
·  Audit trail capture 
·  Data destruction 
3  Authentication 
Let now us consider the requirements for a common authentication use case: when a 
Web user requests a page with sensitive information. There are  
 
Use Case: Web User Authentication extends Service Web User Request 
Extension Point: User requests Sensitive Web page  
1.  System checks for cached credentials (e.g., in an HttpSession) 
2.  Resume request (authorizing access based on authenticated identity) 
3.  Return result to user 
Alternate Flow: 
1B. If user not already authenticated, system forces authentication by redirecting 
user to authentication page 
a.  User enters credentials and submits page 
b.  System validates credentials 
c.  System stores cached credentials    
d.  System redirects request to resume with original request 
There are three important dimensions to consider in implementing this use case 
with aspects: identifying when a request is received, when to require authentication, 
and how to force authentication. We discuss each of these in turn. 
Identifying  when  a  request  is  received  is  fairly  straightforward.  Handling  user 
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natural to capture these using existing pointcut definition approaches. For a system 
built  using  Java  Servlets  or  technologies that  generate these  (such  as Java  Server 
Pages),  it  is  easy  to  write  pointcuts  that  enumerate  a  small  number  of  method 
execution  join  points  for  service  requests  (or  to  use  pattern-based  pointcuts).  For 
systems built using higher-level frameworks that layer on top of Servlets, such as 
Jakarta Struts, it is typically preferable to capture requests through platform-specific 
join points (like method executions of Struts action execute methods). For Servlets 
and higher-level frameworks, the pointcuts corresponding to a request can be defined 
once and then reused by any application. Indeed, the ajee aspect library [AJEE03] 
contains reusable definitions for both Servlets and Struts. 
Capturing the requests for a specific application is usually straightforward because 
well-written systems use different name spaces (e.g., packages in Java) to segregate 
code  for  different  applications.  This  can  be  more  problematic  for  reusable  UI 
components,  although  our  experience  is  that  these  tend  to  be  aggregated  by 
application-specific request handlers. 
There are some practical challenges in weaving into request-handling components. 
Most popular frameworks use application-specific classes (often extending framework 
classes) so these can be woven into without altering shared infrastructure. However, 
systems like JSP that translate a higher-level language into Java require engineering 
effort to integrate aspects into request processing components. 
A more interesting challenge is identifying when to force authentication. There are 
three basic strategies that vary according to how late (or eager) they are in forcing 
authentication: 
·  During  request processing:  require  authentication  only  when  processing a 
request that attempts to access a secured operation. 
·  After receiving request: require authentication upon starting processing of a 
request that may result in access secured operation. 
·  Before providing resources: require authentication upon starting processing 
of a request that will provide resources (links) to users that may result in 
secured operations. 
We favor the third approach because it offers the best usability (only showing users 
available options) and security (by not providing information about capabilities for 
which a user is not entitled).1  
A request requires authentication if it will perform any operations on data that 
might be restricted, or if it will provide links to the same. This is very similar to the 
better studied case of capturing join points that may result in modifying object states 
(often  desired  for  transaction  management).  Proposals  such  those  described  in 
[GYBE03], [HUGU01], and  [KICZ03]  would  allow  directly  writing a  pointcut  to 
capture  the  right  join  points.  Similarly  to  transaction  management  aspects,  with 
current  AOP  systems  security  implementers  typically  use  application-specific 
properties to directly identify which request processing components that are secured. 
A desirable approach is to define secured requests in terms of other domain-level 
                                                            
1 In the (rare) event that an operation is secured after processing a request that provided a link 
to a user, this approach will not have forced authentication for the newly secured operation. 
In  practice,  the  security  policy  would  likely  force  authentication  or  simply  not  authorize 
access for the user, which could be remedied by refreshing the page. 24-Mar-04  Copyright © 2004 New Aspects of Software, Inc.  4 
definitions (e.g., shopping or personalized requests). Where such a decomposition is 
mostly right then this approach is preferable. By mostly right, we mean that there may 
be exceptions to the rule and that it is better to define pointcuts in terms of domain 
concepts  and  then  modify  them  for  exceptions  (e.g.,  using  enumeration,  marker 
interfaces, or attributes). 
Many systems use arranged patterns [GYBE03] that require structuring the system 
in certain ways to allow classification. For example, it is common to place operations 
that  access  sensitive  data  in  specific  namespaces  or  packages  (e.g., 
“restricted/request.do”).  This  is  also  a  common  practice  for  URL-based  security 
systems  like  Java  Servlets  or  Identity  Management  products  (such  as  Netegrity 
SiteMinder or Tivoli AccessManager).  
Alternative  approaches  include  using  naming  patterns,  enumeration,  marker 
interfaces, or adding metadata through attributes (annotations or tags). Use of naming 
patterns  in  this  context  (e.g.,  using  a  prefix  for  any  secured  Servlet)  seems 
disadvantageous:  it  is  artificial  and  results  in  ugly  and  fragile  code.  Use  of 
enumeration  is  also  hard  to  maintain  and  fragile  because  of  the  large  number  of 
request  handling  components.  Use  of  marker  interfaces  seems  like  a  reasonable 
strategy although in many cases it is less natural than using package structures. 
The use of annotations (also described as metadata or attributes) to identify secured 
requests is also promising (when support for attributes in AOP systems becomes the 
norm).  As  noted  earlier,  it  is  preferable  to  decompose  requests  that  must  be 
authenticated into domain concepts. This is naturally reflected by using annotations 
such  as  @Shopping  or  @Personalized  instead  of  ones  like 
@RequiresAuthentication. Including tags like the latter in the source code is 
problematic  because  it  is  highly  desirable  to  separate  security  specifications  from 
business logic; this author would favor explicit enumeration of locations to scattering 
and tangling security annotations throughout a code base. It’s also worth noting that 
the proposed AspectJ extension for declare annotation [COLY03] that would 
allow adding tags to program elements in a crosscutting manner much as declare 
parents allows adding marker interfaces. This could be used to combine explicit 
tagging with rules that automatically add tags to items based on rules for deal with 
package structures, naming patterns, or even enumeration. 
An  additional  challenge  for  identifying  requests  that  need  to  be  secured  is  the 
presence of external metadata in XML or other formats (e.g., deployment descriptors 
or identity management configuration). This information can be important for picking 
out  what  requests  should  be  secured.  However,  we  are  not  aware  of  any  AOP 
technologies that allow writing pointcuts that reference such externally defined data 
(there are technologies that use XML to represent pointcuts, but this is a different 
problem). 
There  are  also  significant  variations  in  the  implementation  of  authentication 
beyond what we have discussed here. Two examples are support for single sign-on 
across systems and requiring stronger authentication for more sensitive information. 
However, we believe that these variations impose only a few new requirements for 
AOSD solutions and are well modularized by OO implementations. 
There are several other important use cases for authentication, some of which we 
listed in section 2.  One notable case is delegating requests on behalf of a principal 
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or  database  access  requests).  Using  aspects  is  promising  in  scenarios  like  this.  A 
client-side  aspect  allows  capturing  the  identity  of  the  caller  and  then  extend  the 
protocol to include the identity (either through using an extra handshake, using an 
envelop,  or  adding  parameters).  A  coordinated  server-side  aspect  can  unpack  the 
protocol extension and then set up the proper credentials in the recipient. However, 
adding parameters to method call is relatively difficult using current AOP systems 
(e.g., see [BODK03b] for a discussion of how to do this by adding a single operation 
to  a  stateless  session  EJB).  Ideally,  there  would  be  a  mechanism  to  coordinate 
information flow among distributed aspects. 
4  Authorization 
Authorization decisions may depend on a tremendous number of factors: 
·  The requesting user or other principal (by role or individual). 
·  The data being accessed (by class, instance, or field).  
·  The  function  being  performed  (by  classes  such  as  reading  or  writing, 
externalizing, business purpose such as treatment or marketing, or instance) 
·  The context (e.g., delegated requests, who the subject of the data is, what 
jurisdiction applies, whether the system is being attacked) 
·  Other rules (e.g., what contract was used or whether a user has opted-in or 
opted-out, the relationship between requester and subject). 
The tremendous complexity of authorization decisions is one of the features of 
security  decisions  that  makes  AOP  so  valuable  for  security  implementations.  The 
information  required  for  these  decisions  often  crosscuts  a  large  number  of 
components  and  often  changes  independently  of  these.  To  explore  how  to  apply 
AOSD to authorization we look at three common use cases:  
·  functional authorization 
·  data authorization 
·  providing access to user interface elements 
4.1  Functional Authorization 
Use Case: user accesses restricted function 
Precondition: user is authenticated 
1.  System checks whether has adequate permission for operation 
2.  Operation proceeds 
Alternate Flow: 
1B. User does not have permission to perform operation: 
2B. System throws exception and aborts processing 
 
Functional  authorization  implement  checks  for  whether  an  entire  function  can  be 
accessed. The join points in question are typically method executions (or calls). It is 
common for authorization checks to be performed upon entry to a system layer (e.g., 
the user interface or business domain). As such, existing pointcuts typically capture 24-Mar-04  Copyright © 2004 New Aspects of Software, Inc.  6 
these quite well. E.g., a pointcut can pick out execution of any public methods in a 
package or subpackage, or any such that is not in the control flow below another.  
It is normal to throw security exceptions when violations are detected. It is easy to 
throw  exceptions  from  before  advice  from  almost  any  AOP  system.  Handling 
exceptions is also a natural application for aspects (e.g., see [LIPP99]); in our case 
aspects  might  redirect  users  to  a  common  “not  authorized”  page.  However,  for 
requests that are not authorized to perform specific functions the issue can become 
more  complicated.  This  topic  is  closely  related  to  the  discussion  on  disabling  UI 
elements  in  4.3  below  (which  includes  cases  of  handling  partially  authorized 
functions). 
There is another wrinkle for Java-based AOP systems. Java is the  only  widely 
programming language one with the concept of checked exceptions: any method that 
throws a Throwable that doesn’t extend Error or RuntimeException must 
declare that it throws that exception type (or some supertype thereof). So in Java AOP 
systems, throwing checked exceptions from advice poses some challenges; either the 
developer needs to refactor code that is affected by the advice by scattering throws 
declarations throughout, or else they need to use the Exception Introduction pattern 
[LADD03] to wrap the checked exception and unpack it where used. Fortunately, 
Security  exceptions  are  typically  unchecked  in  Java  (e.g., 
java.lang.security.AccessControlException),  so  this  is  not  a 
common problem for implementing authorization checks with aspects. 
Using AOP for functional access checks represents a significant improvement on 
traditional approaches of scattering access control checks or even scattering tags or 
redundant  XML  descriptions  that  obscure  the  underlying  access  control  rules  and 
harm maintainability. It is makes it significantly easier to maintain a role-based access 
control  system,  notably  because  it  splitting  or  changing  responsibilities  can  be 
localized instead of involving coordinating scattered edits. 
4.2  Data Access Authorization 
Use Case: user accesses restricted data element 
Precondition: user is authenticated 
1.  System checks whether has adequate permission 
2.  Data access proceeds 
Alternate Flow: 
1B. User does not have permission to perform operation: 
2B. System throws exception and aborts processing 
 
Data  Access  authorization  is  typically  more  fine-grained  than  functional 
authorization. As such, it needs to be enforced wherever sensitive data is accessed. 
One common pattern is restricting access to classes of data depending on the user’s 
role or their relationship to the subject of data. For example, any user with the role of 
a doctor might have access to any patient record, whereas other users with the role of 
patient can have access only to their own records. In real medical systems, additional 
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restrictions  on  access  by  doctors  for  non-emergency  uses  further  complicate  the 
access control decision. 
To control access to data, it is necessary to identify who is performing the access, 
what the data is, how it is being used, as well as where (the context). Let us consider 
each of these in turn. 
Determining who is accessing data relies on authentication (as described above). 
When a user is authenticated, then their identity and credentials are typically exposed 
as part of a security context. Some security systems provide global access to security 
context (e.g., if using JAAS [LAI99] Permission objects for access control). In other 
cases, it is natural to set up an access control context at authentication points and to 
use  control  flow  mechanisms  to  allow  access  to  this  context  from  access  control 
points. 
Rules that deal with what data is being accessed typically deal with data categories. 
For  example,  the  Platform  for  Privacy  Preferences  (P3P  [P3P])  defines  standard 
categories  including  physical,  health,  demographic,  and  purchase.  Defining  access 
rules in terms of categories is analogous to granting functional access to users based 
on their roles. 
Determining what data is being accessed is an interesting challenge. Most sensitive 
data  is  ultimately  persisted  either  to  databases  or  to  other  systems  (e.g.,  through 
messaging interfaces). It is often natural to categorize data based on storage location 
(e.g., database columns or fields in messages). However, the logic for accessing and 
mapping  these  sources  into  Java  code  is  usually  opaque  to  OO  programs.  For 
example,  if  JDBC  is  used  to  read  a  database,  identifying  what  fields  are  being 
accessed is complicated. Even when O/R mapping technologies are used (like JDO, 
Hibernate, or Container Managed Persistence entity beans), the mapping information 
is typically contained in XML files that are not easily parsed in a running program. 
Similar issues arise in dealing with messages such as JMS and low-level Web services 
APIs. In practice, with current AOP technologies, one tends to control data access 
after it is loaded into memory. However, this approach requires careful monitoring for 
security  holes  (e.g.,  back  doors  that  read  sensitive  data  through  JDBC  or  other 
unexpected means). In addition, providing data security in an application raises the 
question of how to protect data from direct and other kinds of database access. 
Control access to in-memory data involves mapping either entire types or specific 
fields  (or  accessor  methods). Handling  entire  types  is  easier:  it  is  possible  to  use 
marker interfaces (e.g., with declare parents), package structures or naming 
patterns (if natural), annotations (when and where available), or enumeration. A more 
challenging scenario is to categorize access to specific fields within an object (or 
collection).  Sometimes  the  fields  will  themselves  have  a  type  that  can  be 
unambiguously categorized. But for fields of common data types (such as strings and 
numbers), the options available are naming patterns, enumeration, or annotations (if 
available).  
There are also other cases where the content of data is important for determining 
access rules (e.g., for XML or other message structures). In these cases, the most 
reasonable  approach  is  to  have  advice  check  content  rules  whenever  a  possibly 
matching structure is accessed. 
Aspects that control access to data need to be triggered based on the operation 
being performed: how the data is being used. The most basic operations are reading or 24-Mar-04  Copyright © 2004 New Aspects of Software, Inc.  8 
writing the data.  For these cases, expressive AOP languages like AspectJ provide 
effective pointcuts to capture the appropriate kinds of operations. We can combine 
data categorization with either method calls (on objects) or field get and sets to pick 
out join points where a given access rule should execute. Naturally, there are more 
complicated cases; the earlier discussion on functional access control examined this 
dimension (albeit without considering specific data). 
The access context is a catch-all concept that deals with a variety of factors such as 
what individual owns data, what jurisdiction applies, whether permission has been 
given, what policy is in effect, the subject about which data is being requested, the 
relationship between the principal and subject, explicit access control grants, and the 
purpose of the access.  This context is often available using control-flow pointcuts 
although there are cases where additional state needs to be tracked (e.g., counters or 
system state). 
For simple cases, it is common to use Java code to evaluate access rules. However, 
in  more  complex  cases  it  is  desirable  to  use  a  rules  engine.  There  already  exist 
sophisticated rules engines, both general purpose ones and ones specialized for policy 
rules. In any event, we believe evaluating rules is not a crosscutting concern. AOP 
systems can be used to enforce policy in a fine-grained matter while delegating policy 
decisions to such engines. The unique contribution of AOSD is to allow consistent 
policy enforcement that captures all the appropriate context information. 
There  is  an  interesting  question  of  meta-level  vs.  base-level  semantics.  Some 
designs use AOP to provide very broad interception and delegate almost all access 
control decisions to an external engine, passing the engine a great deal of reflective 
data about the current join point. We believe that it is preferable to use pointcuts to 
pick out narrowly defined join points where specific rules might run, and to capture 
context that is then passed to a rules engine. 
Note that if one categorizes data by pointcuts that enumerate or use type patterns, it 
will only be possible to distinguish categories in rules by having separate advice for 
each category. In contrast, marker interfaces or annotations (will) allow for reflective 
access  to  categories  within  a  single  advice.  This  argues  for  using  annotations  to 
categorize  data  (possibly  using  the  proposed  AspectJ  extension  for  declare 
annotation). 
There are other important topics to consider, notably tracking the flow of data in-
memory and combining it. This allows restricting use of information copied into local 
variables or combinations of data (e.g., combining birth date, postal code, and age 
may  be  deemed  personally  identifying  information).  While  basic  access  can  be 
controlled at the “edge” (when first accessing the in-memory representation), this can 
be inadequate for more sophisticated constraints that are based on context of use or on 
the specific operations performed.  
As we have seen from this discussion, there are a tremendous number of factors 
involved in providing data-driven access control. There are significant areas where 
new AOP constructs that support a more direct mapping of concepts would be very 
helpful. However, overall aspects still help tremendously. The good news is that they 
allow us to be much more clear, explicit, and consistent in enforcing policy and in 
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4.3  User Interface Element Authorization 
Use Case: user accesses page containing a restricted user interface resource 
Precondition: user is authenticated 
1.  System checks whether has adequate permission 
2.  Resource is included in output page 
Alternate Flow: 
1B. User does not have permission to perform the associated operation (for links, 
buttons, etc.) or user does not have permission to see the contained data (for 
output of sensitive data elements) 
2B. System omits resource from display 
 
Our last authorization use case represents a twist on the previous two use cases. In the 
case of resources like buttons that access functions, we want to omit (or disable) these 
resources when the user does not have permission for the operation activating them 
would perform.  
In a traditional GUI application, this would be fairly straightforward to enforce, 
e.g., after returning advice on method calls to show buttons disables or hides them if 
the user doesn’t have permission to execute the command associated with the button. 
However, in a Web application the use of mark-up languages complicates resource 
identification. In addition, the mapping from request URL’s into secured resources is 
a challenge.  
The use of mark-up languages makes it difficult to identify resources because the 
output of a page is not naturally available in an object-oriented fashion. This problem 
is relatively easy to handle with language-specific aspects for applications that are 
developed using a specialized API for any secured resources (e.g., requiring custom 
JSP tags such as Struts’ <html:link> tag). A more general-purpose approach is to 
post-process the output of rendering a page to parse any URL’s, and to check those 
for  security.  Finding  these  in  markup  is  straightforward  (e.g.,  by  using  an  XSLT 
stylesheet or a parser). However, if a page uses client-side scripting it is a generally 
unsolvable  problem.  In  practice,  this  is  rarely  a  problem  and  a  bit  of  design  to 
establish standards for writing script functions that link to other pages would make it 
easy to solve in practice. AOP support in client-side scripting languages would offer a 
more general-purpose solution.  
Another challenge in identifying resources within markup is establishing resource 
boundaries. For example, if removing a hypertext link, should auxiliary graphics also 
be removed? Should the entire table cell containing it be removed? When should a 
row be removed? This problem does have an analog in the traditional GUI case, e.g., 
consider needing to hide auxiliary graphics or labels or a parent panel. This is a case 
where  application-specific  policies  seem  important  (along  with  good  modularity 
either by using tags or CSS styles to make it easy to identify resource units). 
Once we have requested URLs, it is often a challenge to map these to secured 
resources.  While  it  should  be  simple  to  design  APIs  that  would  perform  these 
translations, in practice such predictive APIs are not available. In particular, there is 
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URL,  nor  of  determining  what  Struts  Action  would  execute  from  one.2 A  related 
problem  is  integrating  AOP  access  control  with  coarse-grained  external  policy 
descriptions,  such  as  declarative  security  in  a  Java  Web  Container,  or  Netegrity 
SiteMinder  access  rules.  These  policies  are  often  defined  in  an  external  XML 
configuration file with poor APIs for testing whether access to a URL is allowed.  
It would be highly desirable for such APIs to be designed (or extended) to support 
operations to look up permissions as described herein. It is also possible to implement 
such APIs externally by parsing configuration files. In practice, many projects will 
encode duplicate rules (perhaps by using generators that emit XML configuration and 
Java mapping code). It is interesting to note that good OO modularity would benefit 
from APIs such as this; presumably in practice non-AOP implementations have so 
rarely achieved the sophistication required that the APIs haven’t been demanded. 
Another important case when authorizing access to secured resources is displaying 
restricted data (fields) rather than a link to a restricted function. In this case, it is more 
natural  to  perform  access  inline  while  generating  a  page.  Attempts  to  display 
unauthorized information will generate exceptions, which aspects can catch and then 
coordinate  with  the  output  mechanism  (e.g.,  Servlet  or  JSP)  to  “edit  out”  the 
corresponding unit of output and then continue at the right level. Continuing after this 
kind of partial authorization failure can be challenging (e.g., the underlying logic for 
subsequent processing must be designed to not rely on work that might be aborted due 
to lack of access rights). 
5   Other Rules 
There are a number of other security operations that need to be performed beyond 
authentication and authorization. Some include encrypting or signing data, capturing 
audit trails, performing intrusion detection, or capturing obligations (such as deletion 
of data). In many respects, enforcing rules like these is similar to enforcing various 
authorization rules, including imposing a need to authenticate. However, it is more 
common for policies like encryption to require data tracking: sensitive data should be 
encrypted regardless of what interim data structures it is transferred into. This is a 
marked contrast from access control, which can often be performed once upon first 
reading data. 
6   Conclusions 
This paper has outlined several of the problems and opportunities in applying aspects 
to security, with an emphasis on applications to enterprise Web application written in 
Java. We have seen that security is indeed an area that benefits greatly from the use of 
aspects, in describing policies that were hitherto unavailable, in particular for fine-
grained security rules. 
                                                            
2 Naturally, this API would have to support URLs that are external to the current application. 24-Mar-04  Copyright © 2004 New Aspects of Software, Inc.  11 
In the future, we expect security aspects to benefit from more expressive pointcuts 
(e.g.,  predicting  control  flow  and  tracking  data  flow),  the  use  of  annotations  that 
identify more  domain concepts,  more sophisticated exception handling  support, to 
directly  capture  predictive  rules  for  authentication,  and  increased  integration  of 
aspects with external libraries, distributed systems, and markup languages.  
Using aspects for security already offers major benefits in compact code, increased 
confidence, and separation of roles between application development and security. As 
such, it is an application area that will continue to drive important and challenging 
requirements for AOSD. 
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